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American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 5 2016

Bank Leverage and Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Great Depression and Great Recession

Christoffer Koch1; Gary Richardson2; Patrick Van Horn3

1 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2200 North Pearl Street, Dallas, TX 75201 (e-mail: ) · 2 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the University of California in Irvine, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: ) · 3 Southwestern University, Georgetown, TX 78626 )

Abstract

In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.

DOI
10.1257/aer.p20161045
Volume
106
Issue
5
Pages
538-542
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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