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American Economic Review Vol. 101 No. 4 2011

Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation

Christopher A. Parsons1; Johan Sulaeman2; Michael C. Yates3; Daniel S. Hamermesh4

1 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB #3490, Chapel Hill, NC 27599. · 2 Southern Methodist University, PO Box 750333, Dallas, TX 75275. · 3 Auburn University, 415 W. Magnolia Ave., Auburn, AL 36849. · 4 University of Texas at Austin, Maastricht University, IZA, and NBER, 1 University Station C3100, Austin, TX 78712.

Abstract

Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination.

DOI
10.1257/aer.101.4.1410
Volume
101
Issue
4
Pages
1410-1435
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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