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American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 7 2016

Perceiving Prospects Properly

Jakub Steiner1; Colin Stewart2

1 CERGE-EI, Politických Vězňů 7, Praha 1, Czech Republic, and School of Economics, University of Edinburgh (e-mail: ) · 2 Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada M5S 3G7 (e-mail: )

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Abstract

When an agent chooses between prospects, noise in information processing generates an effect akin to the winner's curse. Statistically unbiased perception systematically overvalues the chosen action because it fails to account for the possibility that noise is responsible for making the preferred action appear to be optimal. The optimal perception pattern exhibits a key feature of prospect theory, namely, overweighting of small probability events (and corresponding underweighting of high probability events). This bias arises to correct for the winner's curse effect.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20141141
Volume
106
Issue
7
Pages
1601-1631
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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