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American Economic Review Vol. 103 No. 7 2013

Information and Quality When Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards

Jonathan Kolstad

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3641 Locust Walk, 306 Colonial Penn Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104 and NBER.

open access

Abstract

If profit maximization is the objective of a firm, new information about quality should affect firm behavior only through its effects on market demand. I consider an alternate model in which suppliers are motivated by a desire to perform well in addition to profit. The introduction of quality “report cards” for cardiac surgery in Pennsylvania provides an empirical setting to isolate the relative role of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives in determining surgeon response. Information on performance that was new to surgeons and unrelated to patient demand led to an intrinsic response four times larger than surgeon response to profit incentives.

DOI
10.1257/aer.103.7.2875
Volume
103
Issue
7
Pages
2875-2910
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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