American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 1 2015

Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications

Yuichiro Kamada¹; Fuhito Kojima²

¹ Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, 545 Student Services Building 1900, Berkeley, CA 94720 (e-mail: ) · ² Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: ).

Abstract

Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets on the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions on regions in medical matching, academic master's programs in graduate admission, and state-financed seats for college admission. Motivated by these markets, we study design of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We show that existing matching mechanisms suffer from inefficiency and instability, and propose a mechanism that is better in terms of efficiency, stability, and incentives while respecting the distributional constraints.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20101552

Volume

105

Issue

1

Pages

67-99

Language

en

Sources

openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓