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American Economic Review Vol. 95 No. 4 2005

Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

James M. Snyder1; Michael M. Ting2; Stephen Ansolabehere3

1 Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02139. · 2 Department of Political Science, Columbia University, IAB Floor 7, 420W 118 St., New York, NY 10027. · 3 Department of Political Science, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02139.

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Abstract

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.

DOI
10.1257/0002828054825538
Volume
95
Issue
4
Pages
981-1004
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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