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American Economic Review Vol. 108 No. 7 2018

The Twin Ds: Optimal Default and Devaluation

Seung‐Hoon Na1; Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé2; Martín Uribe3; Vivian Z. Yue4

1 Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management at Purdue University, 403 West State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907 (email: ) · 2 Columbia University, 420 W 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, CEPR, and NBER (email: ) · 3 Columbia University, 420 W 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, and NBER (email: ) · 4 Emory University, 201 Dowman Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and NBER (email: )

Abstract

A salient characteristic of sovereign defaults is that they are typically accompanied by large devaluations. This paper presents new evidence of this empirical regularity known as the Twin Ds and proposes a model that rationalizes it as an optimal policy outcome. The model combines limited enforcement of debt contracts and downward nominal wage rigidity. Under optimal policy, default is shown to occur during contractions. The role of default is to free up resources for domestic absorption, and the role of exchange rate devaluation is to lower the real value of wages, thereby reducing involuntary unemployment.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20141558
Volume
108
Issue
7
Pages
1773-1819
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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