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American Economic Review Vol. 107 No. 3 2017

A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs

Manolis Galenianos1; Alessandro Gavazza2

1 Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham Hill, Egham TW20 0EX, United Kingdom (e-mail: ) · 2 Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom (e-mail: )

Abstract

We estimate a model of illicit drugs markets using data on purchases of crack cocaine. Buyers are searching for high-quality drugs, but they determine drugs' quality (i.e., their purity) only after consuming them. Hence, sellers can rip off first-time buyers or can offer higher-quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase from them again. In equilibrium, a distribution of qualities persists. The estimated model implies that if drugs were legalized, in which case purity could be regulated and hence observable, the average purity of drugs would increase by approximately 20 percent and the dispersion would decrease by approximately 80 percent. Moreover, increasing penalties may raise the purity and affordability of the drugs traded by increasing sellers’ relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus first-time buyers.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20150540
Volume
107
Issue
3
Pages
858-896
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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