← Search

American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 5 2016

Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy

Edward L. Glaeser1; Andrew Hillis2; Scott Duke Kominers3; Michael Luca4

1 Department of Economics and John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Littauer Center, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, and NBER (e-mail: ) · 2 Department of Economics, Harvard University, and Harvard Business School, Baker Library, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: ) · 3 Society of Fellows, Department of Economics, Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Center for Research on Computation and Society, and Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, and Harvard Business School, Arthur Rock Center for Entrepreneurship, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA · 4 Harvard Business School, Baker Library, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: )

Abstract

The proliferation of big data makes it possible to better target city services like hygiene inspections, but city governments rarely have the in-house talent needed for developing prediction algorithms. Cities could hire consultants, but a cheaper alternative is to crowdsource competence by making data public and offering a reward for the best algorithm. A simple model suggests that open tournaments dominate consulting contracts when cities can tolerate risk and when there is enough labor with low opportunity costs. We also report on an inexpensive Boston-based restaurant tournament, which yielded algorithms that proved reasonably accurate when tested “out-of-sample” on hygiene inspections.

DOI
10.1257/aer.p20161027
Volume
106
Issue
5
Pages
114-118
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

Cite