American Economic Review Vol. 93 No. 3 2003
What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game
Abstract
The ultimatum game, by its all-or-nothing nature, makes it difficult to discern what kind of preferences may be generating choices. We explore a game that convexifies the decisions, allowing us a better look at the indifference curves of bargainers while maintaining the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We conclude that bargainers' preferences are convex and regular but not always monotonic. Money-maximization is the sole concern for about half of the subjects, while the other half reveal a preference for fairness. We also found, unexpectedly, the importance of risk aversion among money-maximizing proposers, which in turn generates significant bargaining power for fair-minded responders.
- DOI
- 10.1257/000282803322157034
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 672-685
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex