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American Economic Review Vol. 93 No. 3 2003

What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game

James Andreoni1; Marco Castillo2; Ragan Petrie3

1 Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706. · 2 Environmental Policy Program, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303. · 3 Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303.

Abstract

The ultimatum game, by its all-or-nothing nature, makes it difficult to discern what kind of preferences may be generating choices. We explore a game that convexifies the decisions, allowing us a better look at the indifference curves of bargainers while maintaining the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We conclude that bargainers' preferences are convex and regular but not always monotonic. Money-maximization is the sole concern for about half of the subjects, while the other half reveal a preference for fairness. We also found, unexpectedly, the importance of risk aversion among money-maximizing proposers, which in turn generates significant bargaining power for fair-minded responders.

DOI
10.1257/000282803322157034
Volume
93
Issue
3
Pages
672-685
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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