American Economic Review Vol. 90 No. 1 2000
Naked Exclusion: Comment
Abstract
The ability of an incumbent firm to deter entry by writing exclusionary contracts with customers has been a subject of contention in the antitrust literature. The courts ’ concern with such exclusionary contracts has been challenged by those who argue that an incumbent, faced with buyers whose interest is to promote entry and competition, would have to pay buyers more for the inclusion of exclusionary provisions than it could possibly gain from exclusion. In a provocative article, Eric B. Rasmusen et al. (1991) (henceforth, RRW) have argued that an incumbent may in fact be able to exclude rivals profitably using such contractual provisions
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.90.1.296
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 296-309
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex