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American Economic Review Vol. 104 No. 2 2014

Time Allocation and Task Juggling

Decio Coviello1; Andrea Ichino2; Nicola Persico3

1 Institute of Applied Economics, HEC Montreal, 3000, chemin de la Cte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, Québec, Canada, H3T 2A7 (e-mail: ) · 2 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universitá di Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy, and Department of Economics European University Institute, via Piazzola 43, 50133 Firenze, Italy (e-mail: ) · 3 Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 (e-mail: )

open access

Abstract

A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which we derive. We call this phenomenon “task juggling” and argue that it is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker effort. We then present a model where task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or coworkers, each seeking to get the worker to apply effort to his project ahead of the others’.

DOI
10.1257/aer.104.2.609
Volume
104
Issue
2
Pages
609-623
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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