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American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 8 2016

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Massimo Bordignon1; Tommaso Nannicini2; Guido Tabellini3

1 Def, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, via Necchi 5, 20123 Milano, and CESifo (e-mail: ) · 2 IGIER, Bocconi University, via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milano, CEPR, and IZA (e-mail: ) · 3 IGIER, Bocconi University, via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milano, CIFAR, CEPR, and CESifo (e-mail: )

Abstract

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20131024
Volume
106
Issue
8
Pages
2349-2370
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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