American Economic Review Vol. 104 No. 1 2014
Social Ideology and Taxes in a Differentiated Candidates Framework
Abstract
Many observers argue that political polarization, particularly on social and cultural issues, has increased in the United States. How does this influence the political competition on economic issues? We analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share. In equilibrium, candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically-liberal voters, as well as socially-liberal and economically-conservative voters. We analyze how voters’ cultural preferences and candidates’ cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.104.1.308
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 308-322
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref