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American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 11 2015

Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism

Rafael Di Tella1; Ricardo Perez-Truglia2; Andres Babino3; Mariano Sigman4

1 Harvard Business School, 15 Harvard Way, Morgan Hall 283, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: ) · 2 Microsoft Research, New England Research and Development (NERD) Lab, 1 Memorial Drive, Office 12073, Cambridge, MA 02142 (e-mail: ) · 3 Departamento de Física, UBA, Caldas 1700 3, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, C.P. 1426, Argentina (e-mail: ) · 4 Departamento de Física, FCEN, UBA, and IFIBA, and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Almirante Juan Saenz Valiente 1010, C1428BIJ, Buenos Aires, Argentina (e-mail: )

open access

Abstract

We present results from a “corruption game” (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20141409
Volume
105
Issue
11
Pages
3416-3442
Language
en
Sources
crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex

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