American Economic Review Vol. 109 No. 12 2019
Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms
Abstract
We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with limited enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth consumption. It can also undertake costly reforms to speed up recovery. The sovereign can renege on contracts by suffering a stochastic cost. The constrained optimal allocation (COA) prescribes imperfect insurance with non-monotonic dynamics for consumption and effort. The COA is decentralized by a competitive equilibrium with markets for renegotiable GDP-linked one-period debt. The equilibrium features debt overhang: reform effort decreases in a high debt range. We also consider environments with less complete markets.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.20161457
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 4220-4259
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref