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American Economic Review Vol. 109 No. 12 2019

Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms

Andreas Müller1; Kjetil Storesletten2; Fabrizio Zilibotti3

1 University of Essex, Department of Economics, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ UK (email: ) · 2 University of Oslo, Department of Economics, PO Box 1095 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway (email: ) · 3 Yale University, Department of Economics, PO Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520 (email: )

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Abstract

We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with limited enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth consumption. It can also undertake costly reforms to speed up recovery. The sovereign can renege on contracts by suffering a stochastic cost. The constrained optimal allocation (COA) prescribes imperfect insurance with non-monotonic dynamics for consumption and effort. The COA is decentralized by a competitive equilibrium with markets for renegotiable GDP-linked one-period debt. The equilibrium features debt overhang: reform effort decreases in a high debt range. We also consider environments with less complete markets.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20161457
Volume
109
Issue
12
Pages
4220-4259
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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