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American Economic Review Vol. 104 No. 11 2014

The Power of Communication

David Rahman

Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1925 Fourth Street South, Minneapolis, MN 55455 (e-mail: ).

Abstract

In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make my case in the context of a repeated Cournot oligopoly with flexible production, prices that follow a Brownian motion and no monetary side payments, an environment where it has previously been argued that any collusion is impossible. Trade associations can easily facilitate collusion by mediating communication amongst firms.

DOI
10.1257/aer.104.11.3737
Volume
104
Issue
11
Pages
3737-3751
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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