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American Economic Review Vol. 104 No. 12 2014

Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process

Marianne Bertrand1; Matilde Bombardini2; Francesco Trebbi2

1 Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: ) · 2 Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 997-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1 (e-mail: )

open access

Abstract

Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members of Congress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians? We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illustrate how both are at work. In support of the connections view, we show that lobbyists follow politicians they were initially connected to when those politicians switch to new committee assignments. In support of the expertise view, we show that there is a group of experts that even politicians of opposite political affiliation listen to. However, we find a more consistent monetary premium for connections than expertise.

DOI
10.1257/aer.104.12.3885
Volume
104
Issue
12
Pages
3885-3920
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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