American Economic Review Vol. 104 No. 5 2014

Costly Persuasion

Matthew Gentzkow¹; Emir Kamenica²

¹ University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, and NBER (e-mail: ) · ² University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: )

Abstract

We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. We show that Kamenica & Gentzkow's (2011) concavification approach to characterizing optimal signals extends to these settings.

DOI

10.1257/aer.104.5.457

Volume

104

Issue

5

Pages

457-462

Language

en

Sources

crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex

Cite

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