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American Economic Review Vol. 103 No. 1 2013

Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

Jonathan Brock1; Andreas Lange2; Erkut Y. Ozbay3

1 European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, One Exchange Square, London EC2A 2JN, United Kingdom. · 2 Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von Melle Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, Germany. · 3 Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 3105 Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742.

open access

Abstract

We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior.

DOI
10.1257/aer.103.1.415
Volume
103
Issue
1
Pages
415-437
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

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