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American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 5 2016

Infrastructure, Incentives, and Institutions

Nava Ashraf1; Edward L. Glaeser2; Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto3

1 Harvard Business School, Baker Library 443, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163, and NBER (e-mail: ) · 2 Department of Economics, Harvard University, Littauer Center 315A, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, and NBER (e-mail: ) · 3 CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona GSE, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain (e-mail: )

open access

Abstract

Expensive infrastructure is ineffective if it doesn't travel the last mile. In nineteenth-century New York and modern Africa, disease has spread when urbanites chose not to use newly built sanitation infrastructure to save money. Either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can internalize the externalities that occur when people don't use sanitation infrastructure, but with weak institutions subsidies generate waste and fines lead to extortion. Our model illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and shows how institutional weaknesses determine whether fines, subsidies, both or neither are optimal. Contrary to Becker (1968), the optimal fine is often mild to reduce extortion.

DOI
10.1257/aer.p20161095
Volume
106
Issue
5
Pages
77-82
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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