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American Economic Review Vol. 109 No. 1 2019

An Economic Analysis of Privacy Protection and Statistical Accuracy as Social Choices

John M. Abowd1; Ian M. Schmutte2

1 US Census Bureau HQ 8H120, 4600 Silver Hill Road, Washington, DC 20233, and Cornell University (email: ) · 2 Department of Economics, University of Georgia, B408 Amos Hall, Athens, GA 30602 (email: )

open access

Abstract

Statistical agencies face a dual mandate to publish accurate statistics while protecting respondent privacy. Increasing privacy protection requires decreased accuracy. Recognizing this as a resource allocation problem, we propose an economic solution: operate where the marginal cost of increasing privacy equals the marginal benefit. Our model of production, from computer science, assumes data are published using an efficient differentially private algorithm. Optimal choice weighs the demand for accurate statistics against the demand for privacy. Examples from US statistical programs show how our framework can guide decision-making. Further progress requires a better understanding of willingness-to-pay for privacy and statistical accuracy.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20170627
Volume
109
Issue
1
Pages
171-202
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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