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American Economic Review Vol. 98 No. 3 2008

Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-Distance Trade

Erik O. Kimbrough1; Vernon L. Smith2; Bart J. Wilson2

1 Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, MSN B2, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444. · 2 Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866.

Abstract

This laboratory experiment explores the extent to which impersonal exchange emerges from personal exchange with opportunities for long-distance trade. We design a three-commodity production and exchange economy in which agents in three geographically separated villages must develop multilateral exchange networks to import a good only available abroad. For treatments, we induce two distinct institutional histories to investigate how past experience with property rights affects the evolution of specialization and exchange. We find that a history of unenforced property rights hinders our subjects' ability to develop the requisite personal social arrangements to support specialization and effectively exploit impersonal long-distance trade.

DOI
10.1257/aer.98.3.1009
Volume
98
Issue
3
Pages
1009-1039
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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