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American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 11 2016

Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions

Takeharu Sogo1; Dan Bernhardt2; Tingjun Liu3

1 Department of Global Business, Osaka International University, 6-21-57 Tohda Moriguchi, Osaka 570-8555, Japan (e-mail: ) · 2 Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 225B David Kinley Hall, 1407 West Gregory Drive, Urbana, IL 61801, and University of Warwick (e-mail: ) · 3 Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, and Hanguing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance, Renmin University of China, Bejing 100872, China. (e-mail: )

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Abstract

We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20151538
Volume
106
Issue
11
Pages
3577-3589
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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