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American Economic Review Vol. 109 No. 6 2019

Test Design and Minimum Standards

Peter M. DeMarzo1; Ilan Kremer2; Andrzej Skrzypacz1

1 Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 (email: ) · 2 Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, and Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel 91904, and University of Warwick (email: )

Abstract

We analyze test design and certification standards when an uninformed seller has the option to generate and disclose costly information regarding asset quality. We characterize equilibria by a minimum principle: the test and disclosure policy are chosen to minimize the asset’s value conditional on nondisclosure. Thus, when sellers choose the information provided, simple pass/fail certification tests are likely to dominate the market. A social planner could raise informational and allocative efficiency, and lower deadweight testing costs, by raising the certification standard. Monopolist certifiers also satisfy the minimum principle but set a higher standard and reduce testing rates to maximize revenue.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20171722
Volume
109
Issue
6
Pages
2173-2207
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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