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American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 5 2015

Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment

Charles Noussair1; Daan van Soest2; Jan Stoop3

1 Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, the Netherlands and CentER (e-mail: ) · 2 Department of Economics and TSC, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, the Netherlands (e-mail: ) · 3 Department of Applied Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands (e-mail: )

Abstract

We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.

DOI
10.1257/aer.p20151018
Volume
105
Issue
5
Pages
408-413
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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