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American Economic Review Vol. 99 No. 1 2009

Diversity in the Workplace

John Morgan1; Felix Várdy2

1 Department of Economics and Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. · 2 International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20431.

Abstract

We study minority representation in the workplace when employers engage in optimal sequential search and minorities convey noisier signals of ability than mainstream job candidates. The greater signal noise makes it harder for minorities to change employers' prior beliefs. When employers are selective, this leads to minority underrepresentation in the workplace. Diversity improves when the cost of interviewing, the average skill level of candidates, or the opportunity cost of not hiring increases. Reducing the cost of firing also increases minority representation. When employers are sufficiently unselective, the rigidity of employers' beliefs leads to overrepresentation of minorities.

DOI
10.1257/aer.99.1.472
Volume
99
Issue
1
Pages
472-485
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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