American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 6 2015

Clientelism in Indian Villages

Siwan Anderson¹; Patrick Francois²; Ashok Kotwal³

¹ Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 997-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1, and Canadian Institute For Advanced Research (e-mail: ) · ² Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 997-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1, Canadian Institute For Advanced Research, and CEPR (e-mail: ) · ³ Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 997-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1 (e-mail: )

Abstract

We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20130623

Volume

105

Issue

6

Pages

1780-1816

Language

en

Sources

openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Cite

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