American Economic Review Vol. 102 No. 3 2012
Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types
Abstract
We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasilinear environment. We present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between “payoff types” and “belief types” and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type - belief type language.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.102.3.319
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 319-324
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref