← Search

American Economic Review Vol. 103 No. 1 2013

Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Liran Einav1; Amy Finkelstein2; Stephen P. Ryan3; Paul Schrimpf4; Mark R. Cullen5

1 Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-6072, and NBER. · 2 Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142-1347, and NBER. · 3 Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, 2225 Speedway Stop C3100, Austin, TX 78712-1690, and NBER. · 4 Department of Economics, the University of British Columbia, 997-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z1. · 5 Department of Internal Medicine, School of Medicine, Stanford University, 1265 Welch Road, Stanford, CA 94305-5414, and NBER.

open access

Abstract

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.

DOI
10.1257/aer.103.1.178
Volume
103
Issue
1
Pages
178-219
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Cite