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American Economic Review Vol. 95 No. 4 2005

Fairness and Redistribution

Alberto Alesina1; George‐Marios Angeletos2

1 Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Center for Economic Policy Research. · 2 Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142, and NBER.

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Abstract

Different beliefs about the fairness of social competition and what determines income inequality influence the redistributive policy chosen in a society. But the composition of income in equilibrium depends on tax policies. We show how the interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equilibria or multiple steady states. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, effort will be high and the role of luck will be limited, in which case market outcomes will be relatively fair and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If, instead, a society believes that luck, birth, connections, and/or corruption determine wealth, it will levy high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. These insights may help explain the cross-country variation in perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies.

DOI
10.1257/0002828054825655
Volume
95
Issue
4
Pages
960-980
Language
en
Sources
crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex

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