American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 5 2015

Measuring Vote-Selling: Field Evidence from the Philippines

Allen Hicken¹; Stephen Leider²; Nico Ravanilla³; Dean Yang⁴

¹ Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 7642 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 (e-mail: ) · ² Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan Street R4486, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (e-mail: ) · ³ Department of Political Science and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, 5700 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (e-mail: ) · ⁴ Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, 3315 Weill Hall, 735 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (e-mail: )

Abstract

Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.

DOI

10.1257/aer.p20151033

Volume

105

Issue

5

Pages

352-356

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓