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American Economic Review Vol. 103 No. 3 2013

Bailouts and the Optimal Taxation of Bonus Pay

Timothy Besley1; Maitreesh Ghatak2

1 London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. · 2 LSE, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK

Abstract

This paper argues that the possibility of bailouts to financial intermediaries distorts the supply price of capital and creates an argument for taxing financial bonuses separately from other sources of income. We develop a model of financial contracting where intermediaries compete for workers whose actions affect productivity and risk-taking in the financial sector. This derives the second-best optimum and market equilibrium. The optimal taxes that we propose increase both equity and efficiency compared to the pure market outcome.

DOI
10.1257/aer.103.3.163
Volume
103
Issue
3
Pages
163-167
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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