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American Economic Review Vol. 107 No. 12 2017

Recall and Unemployment

Shigeru Fujita1; Giuseppe Moscarini2

1 Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106 (email: ) · 2 Department of Economics and Cowles Foundation, Yale University, 28 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511, and NBER (email: )

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Abstract

We document in the Survey of Income and Program Participation covering the period 1990–2013 that a surprisingly large share of workers return to their previous employer after a jobless spell, and experience very different unemployment and employment outcomes than job switchers. The probability of recall is much less procyclical and volatile than the probability of finding a new employer. We add to a quantitative, and otherwise canonical, search-and-matching model of the labor market a recall option, which can be activated freely following aggregate and job-specific productivity shocks. Recall and search effort significantly amplify the cyclical volatility of new job-finding and separation probabilities.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20131496
Volume
107
Issue
12
Pages
3875-3916
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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