American Economic Review Vol. 108 No. 11 2018

Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples

Thành Nguyen¹; Rakesh Vohra²

¹ Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47906 (email: ) · ² Economics Department, University of Pennsylvania, 451 McNeil Building 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (email: )

Abstract

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a "nearby" instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20141188

Volume

108

Issue

11

Pages

3154-3169

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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