American Economic Review Vol. 98 No. 1 2008
When Does Coordination Require Centralization?
Abstract
This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when managers are privately informed and communicate strategically. We consider a multidivisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self-interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk. The only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights. We show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal communication but worsens vertical communication. As a result, decentralization can dominate centralization even when coordination is extremely important relative to adaptation.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.98.1.145
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 145-179
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib