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American Economic Review Vol. 101 No. 2 2011

Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players

Steven D. Levitt1; John A. List1; Sally E. Sadoff2

1 Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, and National Bureau of Economic Research. · 2 Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory, University of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.

Abstract

Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. We analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games—Race to 100 games. We find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the Race to 100 games. We find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games.

DOI
10.1257/aer.101.2.975
Volume
101
Issue
2
Pages
975-990
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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