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American Economic Review Vol. 98 No. 4 2008

Trade Policy and Loss Aversion

Caroline Freund; Caglar Ozden

World Bank, DECRG, World Bank Mailstop MC3-301, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.

open access

Abstract

We develop a political economy model where loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's preferences over trade policy. The policy implications of the augmented model differ in three ways: there is a region of compensating protection, where a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, such that a constant domestic price is maintained; protection following a single negative price shock will be persistent; and irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free trade that favors loss-making industries. The augmented model explains protections of the US steel industry since 1980.

DOI
10.1257/aer.98.4.1675
Volume
98
Issue
4
Pages
1675-1691
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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