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American Economic Review Vol. 114 No. 12 2024

The Real State: Inside the Congo’s Traffic Police Agency

Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra1; Kristof Titeca2; Haoyang (Stan) Xie3; Aimable Amani Lameke4; Albert Jolino Malukisa5

1 University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research (email: ) · 2 University of Antwerp (email: ) · 3 University of Chicago (email: ) · 4 Marakuja Kivu Research (email: ) · 5 Université Catholique du Congo (email: )

Abstract

This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa’s traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency’s revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context, but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, nuancing the notion of state weakness.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20220908
Volume
114
Issue
12
Pages
3976-4014
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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