American Economic Review Vol. 104 No. 5 2014

Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Lawrence M. Ausubel¹; Oleg Baranov²

¹ Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 3114 Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742 (e-mail: ) · ² Department of Economics, University of Colorado, 256 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309 (e-mail: )

Abstract

The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design which has been adopted for many spectrum auctions worldwide. Since its inception, the CCA has been in almost continual evolution. We begin by reviewing some important changes which have already occurred. Despite these enhancements, we observe that the performance of the CCA is still limited by weak activity rules, suboptimal price feedback, and a missing-bid problem. We then describe further evolutionary changes, including new activity rules, new approaches to pricing, and an integration of non-mutually-exclusive bids, which will help to address these issues.

DOI

10.1257/aer.104.5.446

Volume

104

Issue

5

Pages

446-451

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓