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American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 8 2015

Evaluating Behaviorally Motivated Policy: Experimental Evidence from the Lightbulb Market

Hunt Allcott1; Dmitry Taubinsky2

1 Department of Economics, New York University, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, and NBER (e-mail: ) · 2 Harvard University, Littauer M-35, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, and UC-Berkeley (e-mail: )

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Abstract

Imperfect information and inattention to energy costs are important potential motivations for energy efficiency standards and subsidies. We evaluate these motivations in the lightbulb market using a theoretical model and two randomized experiments. We derive welfare effects as functions of reduced-form sufficient statistics capturing economic and psychological parameters, which we estimate using a novel within-subject information disclosure experiment. The main results suggest that moderate subsidies for energy-efficient lightbulbs may increase welfare, but informational and attentional biases alone do not justify a ban on incandescent lightbulbs. Our results and techniques generate broader methodological insights into welfare analysis with misoptimizing consumers.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20131564
Volume
105
Issue
8
Pages
2501-2538
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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