American Economic Review Vol. 101 No. 2 2011

Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 × 2 Games: Comment

Christoph Brunner¹; Colin F. Camerer²; Jacob K. Goeree³

¹ Alfred-Weber-Institute, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimerstrasse 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany. · ² Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Mail Code 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125. · ³ Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006, Zurich, Switzerland.

Abstract

Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.

DOI

10.1257/aer.101.2.1029

Volume

101

Issue

2

Pages

1029-1040

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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