American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 9 2016

Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Jonathan Levin¹; Andrzej Skrzypacz²

¹ Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: ) · ² Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: )

Abstract

The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20141212

Volume

106

Issue

9

Pages

2528-2551

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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