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American Economic Review Vol. 109 No. 2 2019

Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya

Lorenzo Casaburi1; Rocco Macchiavello2

1 Department of Economics, University of Zürich, Schönbergasse 1, 8001 Zürich, Switzerland (email: ) · 2 Department of Management, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A2AE, United Kingdom (email: )

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Abstract

Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: (i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, (ii) poor contract enforcement, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments. We then present a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and test its additional predictions.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20180281
Volume
109
Issue
2
Pages
523-555
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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