American Economic Review Vol. 96 No. 4 2006

Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply

Yeon‐Koo Che¹; Ian L. Gale²

¹ Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, and Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706. · ² Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057.

Abstract

Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale (1998) studied the impact of imposing a cap on lobbying expenditures. They showed that a cap may lead to (1) greater expected aggregate expenditures and (2) a less efficient allocation of a political prize. In their comment, Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein (2005) show that if the cap is not rigid (i.e., its effect on the cost of lobbying is continuous) it has no effect.

DOI

10.1257/aer.96.4.1355

Volume

96

Issue

4

Pages

1355-1360

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

Cite

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