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American Economic Review Vol. 104 No. 7 2014

Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia

Nava Ashraf1; Erica Field2; Jean Lee3

1 Harvard Business School, Baker Library 443, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: ) · 2 Duke University, 213 Social Sciences Building, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708 (e-mail: ) · 3 NYU Wagner School of Public Service, 295 Lafayette Street, 2nd floor, New York, NY 10012 ()

open access

Abstract

We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable.

DOI
10.1257/aer.104.7.2210
Volume
104
Issue
7
Pages
2210-2237
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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