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American Economic Review Vol. 100 No. 5 2010

Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts

Antonio Cabrales1; Raffaele Miniaci2; Marco Piovesan3; Giovanni Ponti4

1 Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Spain. · 2 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Brescia, Via San Faustino, 74/b, Brescia, Italy. · 3 Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark. · 4 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali LUISS Guido Carli and Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de Alicante, Campus de San Vicente, 03080 Alicante, Spain.

Abstract

This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents “choose to work” for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns.

DOI
10.1257/aer.100.5.2261
Volume
100
Issue
5
Pages
2261-2278
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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