← Search

American Economic Review Vol. 110 No. 6 2020

Expert-Captured Democracies

Archishman Chakraborty1; Parikshit Ghosh2; Jaideep Roy3

1 Syms School of Business, Yeshiva University (email: ) · 2 Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi (email: ) · 3 Department of Economics, University of Bath (email: )

open access

Abstract

Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements induce office-seeking parties to serve the expert’s interests, hurting voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information, helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorsements are often better than either alone. Their interaction creates a delegation benefit that makes indirect democracy superior to direct democracy and office-seeking parties better than those motivated by public interest. But voter welfare is highest when an expert captured technocratic party competes against an uninformed populist one.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20181396
Volume
110
Issue
6
Pages
1713-1751
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite