American Economic Review Vol. 102 No. 5 2012

Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

Judd B. Kessler¹; Alvin E. Roth²

¹ The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, 1454 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104. · ² Department of Economics, Harvard University, and Harvard Business School, 25 Harvard Way, Baker Library 441, Boston, MA 02163.

Abstract

Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.

DOI

10.1257/aer.102.5.2018

Volume

102

Issue

5

Pages

2018-2047

Language

en

Sources

openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Cite

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