← Search

American Economic Review Vol. 102 No. 5 2012

The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game

Gary Charness1; Ramón Cobo-Reyes2; Natalia Jiménez2; Juan A. Lacomba2; Francisco Lagos2

1 Department of Economics, 2127 North Hall, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210. · 2 Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica, University of Granada and Globe, Campus Cartuja, s/n, Granada E-18071, Spain.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results show that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees' performance under delegation is higher than under nondelegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible nonstrategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility.

DOI
10.1257/aer.102.5.2358
Volume
102
Issue
5
Pages
2358-2379
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite